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LUOGO E SPAZIO, PLACE AND SPACE: GENDER QUOTAS
AND DEMOCRACY IN ITALY'
Rachel A. Van Cleave2
Space is power. Having a place, a seat, an ability to occupy a
particular space can empower, in part by mere presence, but also by
enabling a voice to be heard, to provide new perspectives, new ways
of thinking and doing.3 Certainly, the recent Arab Uprisings' and the
1. Copyright 0 2012 Rachel A. Van Cleave.
2. Rachel A. Van Cleave, Dean and Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of
Law. Dean Van Cleave has engaged in extensive research on Italian criminal justice,
specifically violence against women, as a Fulbright Scholar. She wishes to thank the
University of Baltimore School of Law and its Applied Feminism Center for the
opportunity to present this paper at the March 2-3, 2012 conference; the University of
Baltimore Law Review staff for their patience working with Italian materials and
sources; Golden Gate University School of Law's generous financial support of this
project; Golden Gate University School of Law's library staff, her research assistants,
Melani Johns (J.D., 2011) and Brian Ford (J.D., 2013); the libraries at the Corte di
Cassazione and the Camera dei deputati in Rome for access as well as helpful
research guidance by the staff; Anna Esposito, Ferdinando Berelli, Stefania Rossi and
Bianca d'Amico for their company while the author was in Rome; Diane Ghirardo for
sparking an interest in gendered space and power as well as for translation and
editorial advice on an earlier version; Michele Benedetto Neitz, Laura Cisneros for
substantive and structural comments; Golden Gate Uuniversity School of Law's
Scholarship Support Group; and Joseph Schottland for unfailing encouragement and
moral support. Of course, any errors are the author's.
3. In a keynote address at Golden Gate University School of Law's Diversity
Graduation, Nancy O'Malley, District Attorney for Alameda County in California,
emphasized the importance of having a seat at the table where decisions are being
made. She stated, "If you [women, people of color, and LGBT people] are not at the
table, there is a good chance you are on the menu." Nancy O'Malley, Dist. Att'y,
Almeda Cnty., Cal., Keynote Address at the Golden Gate University School of Law's
Diversity Graduation (May 17, 2011). Similarly, at the Third Annual Chief Justice
Ronald M. George Lectureship, Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court, as well as participants on a panel of chief justices, repeatedly stated
the importance of "having a seat at the table." Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice,
Cal. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the Golden Gate University School of Law's Third Annual
Chief Justice Ronald M. George Lectureship (Oct. 18, 2011). In addition, during the
two-day conference at the University of Baltimore School of Law, Applying
Feminism Globally, participants said the phrase "a seat at the table" at least a half-
dozen times. Remarks at the University of Baltimore School of Law, Applying
Feminism Globally Conference (Mar. 2-3, 2012).
4. E.g., Ethan Bronner, A Moment Leveled, Solidarity for Shiites and Large-Scale
Demonstrations: Bahrain Tears Down Pearl Sculpture, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2011,
329
330 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
"Occupy" movement' took the forms they did, at least in part,
because the participants understood the importance of physically
occupying symbolically loaded spaces and places to promote political
and social ideas and ideals.6 Conversely, exclusion from a place or
at A10 (discussing the Bahraini government's destruction of the famous pearl
sculpture at the center of Pearl Square in the capitol city Manama, Bahrain), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/middleeast/1 9bahrain.html.
Thousands of pre-democracy demonstrators occupied Bahrain's symbolic center, Pearl
Square, in a month-long rally claiming a 300-foot sculpture of a pearl, held by six
sweeping arches, designed to honor the six gulf states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates),
whose economies thrived on the pearl industry before the oil boom. Id.; Michael
Slackman, Bahrain Takes the Stage With a Raucous Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/middleeast/16bahrain.
html?pagewanted=1& r-1&partner-rss&emc-rss. Bahrain's foreign minister, Sheik
Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, stated that the monument was destroyed "to remove a
bad memory . . . . The whole thing caused our society to be polarized." Bronner,
supra. He further stated, "We don't want a monument to be a bad memory." Id.
Thus, the government also appreciated the symbolic nature of Pearl Square and
decided to destroy it due to its power. See Associated Press, Bahrain Demolishes
Monument at Pearl Square: Pearl Roundabout Symbol Was Rallying Point for
Activists, NBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2011, 5:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com /id/
42125406/ns/world news-mideastn africa/#.T8 6Pb-He 0.
5. See Peter Millership, World intrigued by "Occupy Wall Street" Movement, REUTERS
(Oct. 11, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/11/us-usa-
wallstreet-world-idUSTRE79A3OB20111011 (observing that popular movements
against the powerful elite have been staged in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Green Square,
Tripoli, Syntagma Square, Athens, and Zuccotti Park, New York, expanded to Occupy
movements in Tampa, Florida, Portland, Oregon, Los Angeles, California, Chicago,
Illinois, and then inspired similar movements at the London Stock Exchange and
Madrid's Puerta del Sol square); Julianne Pepitone, Hundreds of Protesters Descend
to 'Occupy Wall Street', CNNMONEY (Sep. 17, 2011, 7:07 AM), http://money.cnn.
com/2011/09/17/technology/occupywall_street/?cnn=yes&hpt-ibu c2 (noting that
"[p]rotestors arranged to meet and discuss their goals on the iconic Wall Street Bull
statue ... as well as at a 'people's assembly' at One Chase Manhattan Plaza," as part
of a "leaderless resistance movement" modeled on the Arab uprisings); Kenneth
Rapoza, 'Occupy Wall Street' Creators Raise the Stakes, Gun for G8 and NATO,
FORBES (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapozal
2012/01/26/occupy-wall-street-creators-raise-the-stakes-gun-for-g8-and-nato/
(reporting that Occupy Wall Street selected the NATO and G8 summits in Chicago,
May 2012, as new targets for its movement).
6. See Susana Torre, 'Claiming the Public Space: The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo,' in
SEX AND THE ARCHITECTURE (Diana Agrest, Patricia Conway & Leslie Weisman eds.),
reprinted in GENDER SPACE ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION
140, 141-42 (Jane Rendell, Barbara Penner & lain Borden eds., 2000) (describing
how women in Argentina appropriated a public space, the Plaza de Mayo, which was
symbolically important in silent protest against "disappearances" of thousands of
people, including their children and husbands, in the mid-1970s by the Argentine
military). Torre discusses the impact of this occupation in both gender and spatial
terms. Id. at 142.
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"negative presence"' often has the effect of silencing and of
marginalizing those who are excluded.' What do space, place, and
power have to do with electoral quotas for women in Italy? As in
other countries, women in Italy have been affirmatively excluded
from many public and political spaces9 until relatively recently.'0
Italian law has enforced and reinforced such exclusions, this negative
presence and marginalization of women in Italian public life." This
article examines how the law has been used to exclude women from
political space and place in Italy, and more generally, the impact this
has had on women's citizenship rights as well as the impact on
democracy.12 In addressing these issues, this article also details the
more recent attempts to provide access to important political spaces,
namely at the national and local levels of government. 3 Framing this
discussion in terms of space and place helps dislodge the issue of
quotas from the stigma with which they are associated in the United
States, in particular." In addition, this perspective seeks to eschew
7. Shirley Ardener, The Partition of Space, in WOMEN AND SPACE: GROUND RULES AND
SOCIAL MAPS (Shirley Ardener ed., 1993), reprinted in GENDER SPACE
ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 112, 113-14 (Jane Rendell,
Barbara Penner & lain Borden eds., 2000).
8. See bell hooks, 'Choosing the Margin as a Space ofRadical Openness' in BELL HOOKS,
YEARNINGS: RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS (1989), reprinted in GENDER
SPACE ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 203, 205, 207-08 (Jane
Rendell, Barbara Penner & lain Borden eds., 2000) (providing a poignant account of
the pain of discussing issues of "space and location" when living in both the space at
the margin, as a black woman the space of the oppressed, as well as "at the center,"
the space of the dominant as a professor at a major American university).
9. While the term "public space" includes "political space," I believe that it is helpful to
consider "political space" more specifically, particularly in the context of electoral
quotas. See Laura Palazzani, La Cittadinanza tra Uguaglianza e Differenza: Le
Istanze del Femminismo Giuridico, 219 ARCHIVIO GHURIDICO 321, 333 (1999)
(asserting that the public/private dichotomy results in the "masculine public" that
politically dominates the depoliticized "feminine").
10. See infra notes 30-41, 72-81 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Parts I, III.A.
13. See infra notes 124, 127, 130, 133-39, 143-50 and accompanying text.
14. See Ruth Rubio-Marin, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and
Why it Won't Fly in the United States, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 118-19 (2012) (arguing
that a set of social, legal, historical, and cultural factors make the use of quotas to
achieve a parity democracy unlikely in the U.S. because women's political exclusion
was traditionally assumed rather than statutorily implemented, as opposed to racial
disparity, which was written into the Apportionment Clause and the Fugitive Slave
Clause of the Constitution). The reactionary movements in the U.S. resisting
women's rights rely heavily on family-related specificities of women in child-rearing
and household management and have created a presumption that measures requiring
equality in the public and private spheres amount to affronts to the traditional family.
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the vexed dichotomies of formal versus substantive equality and
equality of opportunity versus equality of results. Instead, the
structure of space, place, and power provides a richer lens through
which to consider electoral quotas to create political space for
women, broaden representation, and enhance democracy."
Part I of this article briefly outlines the traditional "equality"
approaches for evaluating quotas, in order to illustrate that notions of
equality are only partially useful for resolving questions of electoral
quotas for women. This section also considers the meaning of the
term quota and explains that there is a broad array of measures that
comes within the term electoral quota. This range of methods for
increasing the presence of women in elected offices calls for a
broader and richer lens through which to view them." Part II
explores the framework of space, place, and power to consider how
this perspective might reshape the discussion of quotas and other
affirmative measures to increase the number of women in elected
office. Part III delves into the history of equality struggles in Italy
beginning with an in-depth look at the legally sanctioned negative
presence of women. This section also briefly describes relatively
recent efforts of the feminist movement to bring about equality from
women's external, negative presence. Finally, Part IV turns to
specific examples of efforts to undo this proscription and establish
what a number of Italian scholars describe as "equilibrium" of the
sexes in political representation." The Italian Parliament and the
Constitutional Court have been the protagonists in this effort, with
one institution advancing quotas while the other resists and then both
Id. at 119-24; see also Aili Mari Tripp, Creating Collective Capabilities: Women,
Agency, and the Politics of Representation, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 219, 224-25
(2010) (indicating that there is little discussion of collective strategies to address
women's political disempowerment in the U.S. because the liberal philosophical
frame in the U.S. does not encompass a sense that women have experienced collective
disempowerment, as opposed to individual inadequacy).
15. Anne Phillips explored similar issues, specifically challenging arguments against the
importance of presence. ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE (1995). My
research reinforces her arguments but considers the specific example of electoral
quotas in Italy and the history of the deliberate exclusion of women from citizenship
rights. See infra Parts II.A, IV.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See MARILA GUADAGNINI & LUCIA AMARAL, Introduzione, in DA ELETERICI A ELETTE:
RIFORME ISTITUZIONALI E RAPPRESENTANZA DELLE DONNE IN ITALIA, IN EUROPA E
NEGLI STATI UNITI [From Electric to Elected: Institutional Reforms and
Representation of Women in Italy, in Europe and in the United States] 7 (Marila
Guadagnini ed., 2003); infra Part IV.
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switching roles." This section also describes the current status of
electoral quotas in Italy."
I. FORMAL EQUALITY ESCHEWS "DISCRIMINATION TO
REMEDY DISCRIMINATION"
Traditional notions of equality dictate that government should not
use discrimination in the form of quotas to correct past
discrimination.20 On the basis of this assumption, the law must
remain neutral unless there is current discrimination, which is
appropriate to prevent and to remedy.2' This section explores the
limitations of this approach in the U.S. and contrasts it with
differences in the Italian Constitution.2 2 This section also considers
different forms of electoral quotas.23
In the U.S., the traditional equality framework is consistent with
the constitutional approach to individual rights; the Constitution acts
as a negative force limiting the government's ability to infringe on
certain rights of individuals.2 4 The U.S. approach also helps to
explain why, despite a history of exclusion and discrimination against
women, people of color, and other minorities, the state has limited
abilities to implement affirmative policies to correct or rectify past
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42, 242-50, 257.
20. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003); Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz &
Ruth Rubio-Marin, Constitutional Justification ofParity Democracy, 60 ALA. L. REV.
1171, 1177 (2009); Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality
on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119,
1170(2006).
21. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351-52.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-29.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 30-41.
24. See Tripp, supra note 14, at 219 (arguing that while the liberal philosophical approach
emphasizes individual capabilities, it must also encompass the collective capability to
act, and must include principles of agency, before women can reach the full potential
of citizenry). Collective strategies, like the introduction of quotas make it possible to
tackle structural gender disparities in ways that cannot be achieved by individualistic
approaches to gender equality, and enhance the effectiveness of individualistic
strategies. Id. at 224-25; see also Rubio-Marin, supra note 14, at 100 (noting that
Europe is gradually shifting from an equal rights/opportunities sex equality
framework to a parity democracy equality model, which enables the genders to
participate in all domains of citizenship equally). The parity democracy model
emphasizes that equality between the sexes in both the public and private domain is
necessary for a properly functioning democracy, rather than merely a nicety that
formal equality is expressed in a categorical rule of not treating the sexes differently,
as opposed to a substantive equality mandate which would ensure that there are no
disadvantages attached to a person's sex. Id. at 105, 113.
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discrimination and exclusion.25 Clearly, an approach triggered only
when discrimination is present is not capable of promoting
inclusion.26
By contrast, the Italian Constitution, like other post-war
constitutions, includes positive language setting out what the
government must do to protect individual rights.2 7 While the use of
positive rights language does not eliminate the need for an equality
analysis, such language directing government to remove barriers to
equality establishes a basis for this analysis to expand beyond the
cramped considerations of formal equality. The key here is that
constitutional acknowledgement of the need to address obstacles to
equality allows history and context to inform and thus enrich an
equality analysis, opening the door to remedial measures designed to
overturn discriminatory practices and laws. 28  Exposing the history
and context of the "negative presence" of women in public life, for
25. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333, 351-52.
26. Rosenblum, supra note 20, at 1128 (providing a compelling and comprehensive
explanation of the difference between the French concern with "parity" to support
quotas and the concern in the United States with combating discrimination, and how
these distinct perspectives make quotas impossible to support in the U.S., but tenable
in France, at least as to women). Other approaches have examined the impact that
extremely low numbers of women in elected office have had on the ability to achieve
a "true democracy." Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Marin, The Gender of
Representation: On Democracy, Equality, and Parity, 6 INT'L J. CoNST. L. 287, 289
(2008) ("[A] model of democracy based on gender parity completes the transition
from the liberal state to the democratic state."). See also Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz &
Ruth Rubio-Marin, supra note 20, at 1182-83 (arguing that gender parity is necessary
because the democratic state is currently a patriarchal state as a response to the
concern that parity would require affirmative action for other underrepresented
groups). Negative rights, or the right to engage in an activity free from governmental
interference, are the traditional framework of rights in the U.S. Generally, negative
rights adequately serve the interests of the political majority in a democracy.
However, positive rights to engage in an activity allow politically under-represented
groups in a democracy to correct structural shortfalls, even if the correction requires
governmental assistance. See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 883 n.12 (1989). See generally Paul N. Cox,
The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on
Judicial Role, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 87 (1981) (exploring the validity of "voluntary"
affirmative action plans versus the validity of "involuntary" quotas); Barbara Stark,
Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward
and "Entirely New Strategy", 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1992) (discussing the potential to
establish new economic and social standards in the United States by ratifying the
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92 (discussing the Italian Constitution equality
provisions in more detail).
28. See Yvonne Galligan, Bringing Women in: Global Strategies for Gender Parity in
Political Representation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASs 319, 319-
29 (2006); discussion infra Part III.A.
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example, understood as a condition established and perpetuated by
legal and social frameworks, can enhance an awareness of the need to
broaden inclusion, as well as help clarify what such reforms might
look like.29
Several countries use reserved seat quotas for elected or appointed
positions,o which guarantee that women will hold political office and
thus a place in government.' Yet, this definition does not represent
what Italy and other countries have designed in attempts to increase
the number of women in elected offices. Other countries approach
the problem of few women in politics less directly by enacting laws
that impose requirements on the formation or presentation of
candidate lists, ensuring that women have a place on the ballots that
may then lead to a place in government.3 2 As of 2007, twenty-six
countries had adopted candidate quota laws requiring political parties
to put forth a certain percentage of female candidates." Space
matters even in such apparently trivial matters as placement on the
ballot. Eleven of the countries with candidate quotas further insist on
placement mandates to ensure that women candidates are not listed at
the bottom of the ballot. 34  These countries have found that when
women candidates are so placed they rarely take office because their
party's proportionate share of seats is unlikely to be great enough to
reach the bottom of the ballot. 35 For example, Mexico's electoral law
29. See Galligan, supra note 28, at 319-21; infra Part III.A.
30. DRUDE DAHLERUP, WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL GENDER QUOTAS?: FROM
STUDIES OF QUOTAS DISCOURSES TO RESEARCH TO QUOTA EFFECTS 25 (2006),
available at http://ipsa-rcl9.anu.edu.au/Dahlerup.ipsa06.pdf (setting out a chart
listing elected reserved seats in countries such as Rwanda, Jordan, Burundi and
countries with reserved seats for appointed positions, such as Tanzania, Pakistan and
Kenya).
31. Id. at 6, 25.
32. See Galligan, supra note 28, at 321-23.
33. Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Making Quotas Work: The Effect of Gender Quota Laws
on the Election of Women, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 6-7 (2009) (describing Argentina as
the first country to adopt candidate quota laws); see also Galligan, supra note 28, at
321-29 (analyzing the success of candidate quotas and ballot placement
requirements).
34. Schwindt-Bayer, supra note 33, at 11-12.
35. See e.g., Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, In Egypt's New Parliament, Women Will Be
Scarce, NPR, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/
01/19/145468365/in-egypts-new-parliament-women-will-be-scarce (describing recent
elections in Egypt which resulted in less than 2% of parliamentary seats going to
women and explaining that women on party lists were placed "far down on those lists,
meaning they had virtually no chance of getting into office").
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requires parties to list candidates alternating between men and
women candidates.36
Another creative example is a 2004 Italian law designed to increase
the number of women elected to the European Parliament." This law
provided that, for the 2004 and 2009 elections, neither sex could
make up more than two-thirds of the candidates." While this is
similar to one of the laws discussed below,39 this law included the
additional measure of reducing monetary reimbursements by up to
one-half for any party that presented a list of candidates in violation
of the two-thirds maximum of either sex.40 Thus, the law directly
impacted political parties by creating both incentives to include more
women as well as penalties for not doing so. 4 1
The discussion in Part IV of regional laws in Italy reveals that there
are a number of other creative affirmative measures governments can
pursue to improve the likelihood of increasing the number of women
in elected office.42 The definition of quotas used in the traditional
equality analysis is primarily about reserved seats, and is therefore
inapposite when it comes to evaluating other affirmative measures.4 3
An alternative to traditional notions of formal equality, the lens of
space and place, enriches an exploration of the use of electoral
quotas.
II. GENDERED SPACE AND PLACE
Political space everywhere is gendered. Gendered spaces reinforce
the dichotomy between public and private spheres in how it relegates
women to the domestic, private sphere while men claim control of the
public." This dichotomy has systematically denied women access to
36. C6digo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [COFIPE] [Federal
Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures], art. 220, Diaro Ofical de la Fedraci6n
[DO], 14 de Enero de 2008 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/COFIPE.pdf.
37. See Leggi 8 aprile 2004, n. 90, art. 3, in Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
Italiana[G.U.] 9 aprile 2004, n. 84 (It.), available at http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/
2004/84/1.htm.
38. Id. at art. 3, para. 1.
39. See infra note 152 and accompanying iext.
40. L. n. 90, art. 3, para. 2/2004 (It.). A similar mechanism was enacted in France to
achieve greater parity in elections for the National Assembly. See Rosenblum, supra
note 20, at 1146 (discussing the French law requirement that a party's lists include
one-half men and one-half women and provides for a reduction in state financial
support proportionate to degree to which the list does not meet this standard).
41. See L. n. 90, art. 3/2004 (It.).
42. See infra notes 206-17, 228-43 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
44. See Leslie Kanes Weisman, Women's Environmental Rights: A Manifesto, in
HERESIES: A FEMINIST PUBLICATION ON ART AND POLITICS (1981), reprinted in
336 [Vol. 42
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public space and therefore to political space.4 5 Indeed, especially
political space. Of course, political space is only one of many
gendered spaces. Historically, men have been the architects of most
spaces because they have dominated the professions and careers that
create, define, and thus, control spaces.4 6 From constructing separate-
sex public bathrooms,4 7 to determining the layout of cities, 48 to
structuring government and governmental institutions,49 men have
GENDER SPACE ARCHITECTURE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 1, 2 (Jane
Rendell, Barbara Penner & laina Borden eds., 2000).
45. See id at 2-4.
46. See AARON BETSKY, BUILDING SEX: MEN, WOMEN, ARCHITECTURE AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 20-42 (1995) (describing the impact of male
dominance in the fields of architecture and city planning).
47. Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture and Gender,
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 55-56 (2007) (discussing how the gendering of public
bathrooms is harmful to transgender people); see also LESLIE KANES WEISMAN,
DISCRIMINATION BY DESIGN: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENT
10 (1992) (discussing how "man-made space encodes and perpetuates white male
power and superiority and the inferiority and subordination of women and
minorities"). Indeed, the need for separate-sex bathrooms posed a symbolic and
annoying obstacle to women's full participation in political and governmental life.
Senator Mikulski discusses her advocacy for a women's bathroom in the Senate.
Senator Barbara Mikulski, Opening Dialogue, University of Baltimore's Feminist
Legal Theory Conference: Applied Feminism and Democracy (Mar. 2, 2012), 42 U.
BALT. L. REV. 211 (2013). Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has referred to the
installation of a women's bathroom-equal in size to the men's bathroom-in the
justice's robing room, upon her appointment to the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1993, as a milestone in the progress of women in the American legal
profession. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 SW.
U. L. REV. 189, 198 (2003); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women 's Progress at the
Bar and on the Bench, 54 FED. LAW. 50, 51-52 (2007) (noting that American law
schools notably lacked adequate bathrooms for women prior to the 1970s).
48. Stephanie Lasker, Sex and the City: Zoning "Pornography Peddlers and Live Nude
Shows," 49 UCLA L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2002) (describing how planners zone
pornography to keep it out of most women's lives, thus also excluding women's
voices from discussions about pornography). The list of gendered spaces in
education, in the professions and in the military could go on at great length, with the
common denominator being denying women access to all of them until relatively
recently.
49. For a detailed discussion of the structure of the United State's federal government by
American draftsmen and the Founding Fathers, see Ray Forrester, The Four American
Constitutions: A New Perspective, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 963, 967-68 (1993) (noting that
even after the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, "no
women, black or white, were enfranchised [with the right to vote]"). For a thorough
and fascinating discussion of the evolving role of American women in society and
public life in light of the American Revolution, the American Constitution, and the
debates of men in State legislatures concerning the role of women in American
society, see Samantha Ricci, Rethinking Women and the Constitution: An Historical
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enforced and reinforced gender stereotypes in assembling these
spaces.so The gendered nature of these spaces and places inevitably
controls women.51 As one critical architectural theorist states:
Space, like language, is socially constructed; and like the
syntax of language, the spatial arrangements of our
buildings and communities reflect and reinforce the nature
of gender, race, and class relations in society. The uses of
both language and space contribute to the power of some
groups over others and the maintenance of human
inequality.52
Argument for Recognizing Constitutional Flexibility with Regards to Women in the
New Republic, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 205, 205-07 (2009). In Italy, women
made up 3.7% of the constituent assembly that was charged with drafting a new
constitution after World War II. ELISABETTA PALICI DI SUNi, TRA PARITA E
DIFFERENZA: DAL VOTO ALLE DONNE ALLE QUOTE ELETTORALI 38 (2004) [BETWEEN
PARITY AND DIFFERENCE: FROM WOMEN'S VOTE TO ELECTORAL QUOTAS].
50. I do not intend this statement to create a conflict between men as a group and women
as a group; rather, this merely acknowledges the historical fact that men have
excluded women from many professions and careers, including architecture, city
planning, medicine, ecclesiastical hierarchies, and law and government, to name a
few. See Lasker, supra note 48, at 1175 ("It has become clear that virtually all human
environments are designed, built, and managed by male dominated professions using
assumptions that tend to reinforce existing female stereotypes.") (quoting NEW SPACE
FOR WOMEN 1 (Gerda R. Wekerle et al. eds., 1980)). Certainly, I do not ignore the
significant efforts of many men in the recent past to overturn this system. For
example, Senator Mikulski emphasized the important support and guidance she
received from her male colleagues. Senator Barbara Mikulski, Opening Dialogue,
University of Baltimore's Feminist Legal Theory Conference: Applied Feminism and
Democracy (Mar. 2, 2012), 42 U. BALT. L. REv. 211 (2013).
51. The focus of this article is women. However, certainly the gendered structure of
space also controls transgender people. See Dylan Vade, Explaining Gender and
Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is
More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 261, 273-275
(2005) (arguing against the sex-gender dichotomy as too narrow to protect the "gender
galaxy" since "[t]he ways to be transgender are endless"). Cf Kogan, supra note 47,
at 18 (noting that while white men and women in nineteenth century America were
required to ride in gender segregated rail cars, black women and children were not
allowed passage in the ladies' car. Instead, they were, "relegated to smoking cars and
other second-class accommodations with white and black men"); Ann R. Tickamyer,
Public Policy and Private Lives: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Women's Poverty
and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 KY. L.J. 721, 736-40 (1996) (discussing
the need to scrutinize the "spatiality of communities, labor markets, and households,
all of which can be shown to be subtly gendered" to better address poverty).
52. WEISMAN, supra note 47, at 2; see also Leslie M. Rose, The Supreme Court and
Gender-Neutral Language: Setting the Standard or Lagging Behind?, 17 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 81, 81-84 (2010) (analyzing the exclusionary impact of gender-
specific language in U.S. Supreme Court opinions and arguing for gender-neutral
language).
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Analogous to the ways in which architecture "exists fundamentally
as the expression of an established social order," 3 legal and political
structures reflect placement of power with the dominant group. 4
Political space, in particular, plays a significant role in structuring a
society's spaces, and in turn, power exercised through politics has a
dramatic impact on people, especially on women, and specifically on
women's political rights and citizenship."
Political space is gendered in many ways. Relevant to this article,
political space is gendered insofar as it has created the "negative
presence"" of women in the structure of government, which has
allowed for laws that further limit and stifle women's citizenship and
public voice." Part III below sets out specific examples." Even in
the U.S., women were excluded from having a voice in government
because they were denied the right to vote until 1920."
Political space is also gendered due to the stereotypes it reinforces
about the qualities necessary to be effective in this space.o As one
scholar has pointed out, "[t]he more expansive the executive, the
more masculine or agentic it becomes in the eyes of [its] citizens."
This, in turn, impacts whether voters believe women can fill these
roles.6 2  The circular and self-fulfilling nature of this problem is
further highlighted by the claim that legally created space in the form
of quotas will lead voters to become more comfortable with women
in elected office, and thus, more inclined to vote for them even if
53. WEISMAN, supra note 47, at 178.
54. See DOLORES HAYDEN, THE POWER OF PLACE: URBAN LANDSCAPE AS PUBLIC HISTORY
22-29 (1995) (discussing how the mapping of geographical space in cities both
illustrates and reinforces exclusion from political space).
55. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1857-59 (1994); Margaret Moore, Sub-State
Nationalism and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1319, 1322 (2004); Adelaide
H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
443, 451-52 (1999).
56. E.g., hooks, supra note 8, at 208-09.
57. See Anne Marie Goetz & Shireen Hassim, Introduction: Women in Power in Uganda
and South Africa, in No SHORTCUTS TO POWER: AFRICAN WOMEN IN POLITICS AND
POLICY MAKING 1, 5-8 (Anne Marie Goetz & Shireen Hassim eds., 2003).
58. See infra Part III.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
60. Paula A. Monopoli, Why So Slow: A Comparative View of Women's Political
Leadership, 24 MD. J. INT'L L. 155, 158-59 (2009) (examining the stereotypical
masculine attributes associated with the "Commander-in-Chief' role of the U.S.
President).
61. Id. at 158.
62. Id. at 158-59.
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quotas are repealed or phased out.13  Indeed, each of the studies
indicates that measures that promote the election of women can lead
to continued election of women even once those measures are no
longer in effect.' While electoral quotas may be difficult to justify
under a traditional equality analysis, when men have had a practical
monopoly on political space and have exercised this power to oppress
women's citizenship and other rights-as they have in Italy-the
only effective solution is to break up this monopoly and create
political space for women. 5
Restricted political space in Italy denied women the right to vote
until after World War II; banned women from many professions and
careers, including elected office; and linked their citizenship to that
of their husbands." The history of deliberate and explicit exclusion
of women from political space provides a compelling justification for
implementing strategies designed to affirmatively open political
space for women with a goal of achieving substantive equality.
III. GENDER EQUALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN ITALY
The context of historical negative presence in public life, and
especially political life in Italy, is important background for
evaluating the adoption of electoral quotas. This section first traces
the slow and limited progress of equality in Italy featuring the roles
played by the Constitutional Court and the government-institutions
dominated by men." Next, this section describes the limited success
Italian women have had using spaces and places outside of
governmental institutions.68 Out of both a distrust of governmental
institutions as well as necessity, Italian women have exerted pressure
on government from the outside to insist upon inclusion.6 9 Of course,
63. See Rikhil R. Bhavnani, Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are Withdrawn?
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India, 103 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 23, 29-31
(2009) (concluding that after quotas lapse women are still successful in subsequent
elections), available at http://rikhilbhavnani.com/Bhavnani%2ODo%20electoral%20
quotas%20work%20afterO/o2Othey/2Oare%20withdrawn.pdf; Maria De Paola et al,
Can Gender Quotas Break Down Negative Stereotypes? Evidence from Changes in
Electoral Rules, 94 J. PuB. ECON. 344, 346-47, 350-51 (2010) (examining voter
patterns after electoral quotas were found unconstitutional in Italy and concluding that
such measures are somewhat successful in breaking down negative stereotypes about
women's ability to be effective political officials).
64. See Bhavnani, supra note 63, at 34; De Paola, supra note 63, at 348.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 20-21, 75-123, 182-94.
66. See discussion infra Part III, for more specific discussions of each of these limitations
on women's citizenship in Italy.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 82-123.
68. See discussion infra Part III.B.
69. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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the need to continue to resort to spaces external to political space
further exacerbates the negative presence of women in government.70
A. A History ofNegative Presence
It almost goes without saying that the ability to assume elected
office is an extremely important component of citizenship;
nonetheless, this is merely one of many aspects of citizenship that has
been denied women until relatively recently.71 In Italy, full
citizenship for women has drawn tantalizingly close in the last thirty
years.72 A description of the types of laws that specifically denied
women full citizenship and excluded them from political life, and the
extremely long road to reforming those laws, helps to illustrate why a
form of quotas emerged as the best response to this history. Quotas
and other affirmative measures can open spaces of political life to
women after a history of decidedly and deliberately exclusionary
laws.
Italy began to recognize rights most commonly associated with
citizenship for women only within the last sixty years.74 These rights
include the right to vote;75 to autonomy as to their individual
citizenship;7 1 to participate in the judicial system as lay jurors, judges
and lawyers;77 as well as the right to hold political and other
governmental offices.7 8 Yet, Italy has been slow to recognize most of
these rights. Some Italian commentators have noted that the concept
of citizenship was built without consideration of the presence of
women." This may help to explain this delay. However, many laws
70. See discussion infra Part III.B.
71. See LUCIA CHIAVOLA, LIBERAZIONE DELLA DONNA: FEMINISM IN ITALY 58 (1986);
Eileen McDonagh, Citizenship and Women's Election to Political Office: The Power
ofGendered Public Policies, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP 201, 201-02 (Joanna L. Grossman & Linda C. McClain eds., 2009).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 81-122.
73. See Ann Peters & Stefan Suter, Representation, Discrimination, and Democracy: A
Legal Assessment of Gender Quotas in Politics, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF
WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 174, 174-75 (Joanna L. Grossman & Linda C. McClain
eds., 2009).
74. See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 87-93, 99-05 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
79. Franca Bimbi & Alisa Del Re, A Cinquant'anni dal Voto, in GENERE E DEMOCRAZIA:
LA CIITTADINANZA DELLE DONNE A CINQUANT'ANNI DAL VOTO 11, 12 (Franca Bimbi
& Alisa Del Re eds., 1997).
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that denied women equal citizenship rights expressly excluded
women, and therefore, cannot be considered mere oversights.so
1. The Franchise
Men in government did not grant women in Italy the right to vote
until after World War II in the Italian Constitution of 1945." Indeed,
the issue of the franchise for women was controversial from the
beginning of Italy's unification in 1861.82 Women of Tuscany and
Lombardia-Veneto had enjoyed the right to vote, but upon unification
they were suddenly disenfranchised because the Kingdom of Italy did
not provide for women's suffrage.83 While the issue of extending the
right to vote to women was raised shortly after unification, the
opposition continued to prevail.84 A law enacted during fascism
allowed women to vote in local administrative elections, but not in
political-meaning regional and national-elections. Unfortunately,
this seemingly progressive law was followed immediately by the
abolition of the same local entities.8 ' Finally, a governmental decree
of 1945 declared that the right to vote extended to women.86
80. See infra notes 100-09, 113-17 and accompanying text.
81. Art. 48 (1) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Any citizen, male or female, who has attained
majority, is entitled to vote." ["Sono elettori tutti i cittadini, uomini e donne, che
hanno raggiunto la maggiore eta."]). See generally P. Orman Ray, The World-Wide
Woman Suffrage Movement, 1 J. CoMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 220 (1919) (reporting
women's suffrage efforts through World War I). England was the first western
government to grant a limited right of suffrage to women in 1834. Id. at 220-21.
Ireland followed shortly after in 1837, and then several Germanic governments
permitted women to vote by male proxy during the 1850s and '60s, including several
Austrian and Prussian provinces. Id at 221-22. Throughout the 1870s and 80s, the
right to vote in municipal elections began to be granted to women in the U.S., the
British Empire, and Europe. Id. at 222-28. Norway became the first independent
state to grant full parliamentary suffrage to women in 1913. Id. at 234. Holland
extended complete suffrage to women in 1916, with Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland
granting full suffrage in 1919. Id at 235. The U.S. recognized women's right to vote
with the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920.
Karen M. Morin, Political Culture and Suffrage in Anglo-American Women 's West,
19 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 17, 17-18 (1997). By contrast, it was not until 1971 that
women in Switzerland were able to vote at the federal level, and not until 1990 that
the last of the twenty-six cantons extended the right to vote to women, after compelled
by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. Peters & Suter, supra note 73, at 174.
82. PALICI DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 38.
83. Id.
84. Id at 38-40.
85. Id. at 40-41.
86. Decreto Legislativo 2 febbraio 1945, n. 23 (It.); see also PAIICI DI SUNI, supra note
49, at 41.
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2. Hurdles to Implementing Constitutional Equality
Women were allowed to be candidates for the Constituent
Assembly that drafted the post-war constitution.8 7  Twenty-one
women were elected to the Constituent Assembly, which accounted
for about 3.7% of the Assembly." While these women were a small
minority, at least one commentator asserts that their presence
required the entire Assembly to write a constitution that "took into
account the needs and expectations of those who represented more
than one-half of the population."89 The end result was that women
had a formal "place" in the new constitution; specifically, article
three declares, "All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal
before the law, without distinctions of sex, race, language, religion,
political opinion, personal and social conditions."" This provision
also states that the republic has a responsibility to remove economic
and social obstacles that limit equality among citizens," yet equality
rights for women were implemented slowly and reluctantly.92 One
justification given by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, an
advisory body to the Italian Government on administrative matters)
was that some constitutional provisions, particularly those related to
equality, merely set out guidelines for future legislation and did not
create immediately enforceable rights."
The Italian Constitution also specifies that women have the right to
hold elected positions.94 Despite these and other provisions declaring
87. Decreto Legislativo 10 marzo 1946 n. 74 (It.). The only requirement imposed on
candidates was that they be at least 25 years old. Id.
88. PALICI DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 42.
89. Id.
90. Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Tutti i cittadini hanno pari dignith sociale e sono
eguali davanti alla legge, senza distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di religione, di
opinioni politiche, di condizioni personali e sociali.").
91. Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("t il compito della Repubblica rimuovere gli ostacoli
di ordine economico e sociale, che, Ilimitando di fatto la liberate l'eguaglianza dei
cittadini, impediscono il pieno sviluppo della persona umana e l'effettiva
partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori all'organizzazione politica, economica e socile del
Paese." ["It is the duty of the Republic to remove economic and social obstacles that
in fact limit liberty and equality among citizens, that impair full development of one's
humanity and effect participation of all workers in the political, economic and social
organizations of the country."]).
92. See MANLIO BELLOMO, LA CONDIzIoNE GIURIDICA DELLA DONNA IN ITALIA: VICENDE
ANTICHE E MODERNE [THE LEGAL CONDITION OF WOMEN IN ITALY: ANCIENT AND
MODERN EVENTS] 166, 168 (1996).
93. Id.
94. Art. 51 (1) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Tutti i cittadini dell'uno o dell'altro sesso
possono accedere agli uffici pubblici e alle cariche elettive in condizioni di
eguaglianza, secondo I requisiti stability dalla legge." ["All citizens of each sex may
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equality between the sexes, the initial prevailing interpretation was
that these constitutional declarations were subject to legislative action
to implement." It was not until after a decision by the Constitutional
Court in 196096 that the Italian Parliament finally began to abolish
obstacles and restrictions on women's ability to hold public or elected
office." However, these actions were slow in coming."
Despite these first, timid steps toward parity, a married woman's
citizenship remained dependent upon that of her husband.99 A 1912
law established that a married woman could not hold citizenship
different from that of her husband.'00 Thus, if an Italian woman
married a non-Italian she lost her citizenship.o' In addition, if her
Italian husband changed his citizenship, her citizenship was changed
as well.102  This remained law until 1975 when the Constitutional
Court finally declared a portion of this law unconstitutional.0 3 Only
in 1983 did women achieve full equality between spouses on the
issue of citizenship, when Parliament enacted a law that extended
citizenship to non-Italians who married Italian women,10 4 thus
granting parity in citizenship nearly forty years after the creation of
the new constitution.
hold elected and public offices.under equal conditions, according to the requirements
established by law."]). See infra text accompanying note 204 (discussing a second
sentence that was added to this section).
95. PALICI DI SUNi, supra note 49, at 50.
96. Corte Costituzionale della Repubblica Italiana 18 maggio 1960, n. 33, available at
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1960/0033s-60.html (declaring such restrictions in
violation of the constitution); see also MARILISA D'AMico, IL DIFFICILE CAMMINO
DELLA DEMOCRAZIA PARITARIA [THE DIFFICULT ROAD TO A DEMOCRACY OF PARITY]
xxii (2011).
97. Licia Califano, Azioni Positive e Rappresentanza Politica Dopo le Riforme
Constituzionali [Positive Actions and Political Representation after the Constitutional
Reforms], in DONNE POLITICA E PROCESSI DECISIONALI 47, 48 n. 2 (Licia Califano ed.,
2004).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
99. Legge 13 giugno 1912, n. 555 art. 10, in G.U. 30 giugno 1912, n. 153 (It.), available
at http://www.agenziabrasitalia.it/leggileggel3giul912n555.htm.
100. Id; see also PALICI DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 96 (tracing this law to article 14 of the
Italian civil code of 1865 as well as to article 12 of the Napoleonic code).
101. L. n. 555 art. 10/1912 (It.).
102. Id. at art. 11.
103. Corte Costituzionale della Repubblica Italiana, 16 Aprile 1975, n. 87 (It.), available at
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1975/0087s-75.html (declaring this law in violation
of article 29 of the constitution since it creates serious moral, legal and political
inequality between spouses). The court addressed only article 10 that divested an
Italian woman of her citizenship if she married a foreigner.
104. Legge, 21 aprile, 1983, n. 123, in G.U. 26 aprile 1983, n. 112 (It.); see also Califano,
supra note 97, at 48 n.2; PALICI DI SUNi, supra note 49, at 97-98.
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In addition to these inexplicable delays in establishing equal laws
pertaining to citizenship, equal access to the judicial system for
Italian women was also slow in coming. Participation in the judicial
system, such as the right to vote and the right to individual
citizenship not linked to one's spouse, is an important component of
full citizenship rights. A post-war law, enacted before the creation of
the new constitution, provided the basis for women to participate in
the judicial system as lay jurors.'s This law specifically declared that
there should be no distinction on the basis of sex.106 Although this
forbade distinctions on the basis of gender, and therefore women
could serve as lay members of juries, this law gave with one hand and
took away with the other. It limited the number of women on the list
of each comune to no more than one-third of the total number of
those eligible to serve as lay jurors.'07 Furthermore, a 1956 law stated
that at least one-half of the lay jurors must be men (three out of six)
on the Corte d'assise.os The relatively new Constitutional Court
upheld this limitation, finding that such a provision did not violate
principles of equality and indeed was necessary for the improvement
and efficient functioning of different public offices.' 09 In effect,
when initially confronted with quotas, the court found no
constitutional violation.' 0
A 1919 law"' declared that women were free to practice any
profession, private or public work, but included exceptions based on
sex. A series of laws enacted by the fascist government essentially
voided the minimal level of equality created by this provision."2
Women were prohibited from teaching literature and philosophy in
the high schools and from being school principals, presidents, or
directors of professional schools.1' This chipping away of
professional options for women, thus intensifying their
105. Regio Decreto 31 maggio 1946, n. 560 art. 5, in G.U. 4 luglio 1946, n. 147 (It.); see
also PALICI DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 73.
106. R.D. n. 560 art. 5/1946 (It.); see also PALICI DI SuNi, supra note 49, at 73.
107. R.D. n. 560 art. 5/1946 (It.); see also PALICI DI SuNi, supra note 49, at 73.
108. Legge, 27 dicembre 1956, n. 1441, in G.U. 3 gennaio 1957, n. 2 (It.), available at
http://www.normattiva.itlatto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta-19
57-01-03&atto.codiceRedazionale=056Ul441&currentPage=1; see also PALICI DI
SuNi, supra note 49, at 76.
109. Corte Cost. 24 settembre 1958, n. 56, 1958, G.U. 18 ottobre 1958, n. 253 (It.),
available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do.
110. See id.
111. Legge, 17 luglio 1919, n. 1176. This law has since been repealed.
112. See PALICI DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 69-70 (listing various laws passed by the Italian
fascist government that limited professions for women).
113. See id (citing several laws enacted by the fascist government).
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marginalization, was further highlighted by two laws that prohibited
women from occupying more than 10% of the positions in any public
or private workplace, except for "jobs for which women are
particularly well suited."" 4 Even after the war, women's exclusion
from exercising judicial authority remained clear."' Two women
elected to the Constituent Assembly proposed express language in
article 51 that would have declared, "Women have access to all
grades and levels of the judiciary."ll 6 The Constituent Assembly
members, over 96% of whom were men, voted down this proposal." 7
As to the effect of the constitutional provisions expressly providing
for equality, the Consiglio di Stato took the position that the
provisions in the new constitution would not take effect until
Parliament enacted new laws consistent with the new constitution;
that is, laws that defined precisely how to implement such changes."'
Thus, women were left with the rather circular reasoning that, until
Parliament enacted laws consistent with the new constitution, the
prior, albeit possibly unconstitutional, laws were to remain in
effect."9  It was not until 1960 that the Constitutional Court
addressed this issue. 2 0 At that point, the court concluded that the
distinction based on sex in the 1919 law violated the constitutional
principles of equality as defined in the new 1948 constitution. 2 ' This
decision eventually resulted in a new law that guaranteed women
access to all jobs, professions, and public office, including the
judiciary, without limitation.'2 2 Given the resistance of those within
political institutions to dismantling entrenched barriers to equality, it
is not surprising that the Italian women's movement attempted to
change from outside these institutions.
114. See id. at 70 (citing regio decreto-legge 15 ottobre 1938, n. 1514 (It); regio decreto-
legge 20 giugno 1939, n. 898).
115. Id. at 71.
116. Id. at 72.
117. See id
118. Cons. Stato, IV, Jan. 18, 1957, n. 21 [in Foro it. 1957, III, 41 - with a note].
119. See Corte Cost., 13 maggio 1960, n. 33, Giur. it. 1960 (It.), available at
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1960/0033s-60.html; Cons. Stato, IV, 18 gennaio
1957, n. 21, Foro it. 1957, 111, 41 (It.).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Legge 9 febbraio 1963, n. 66, in G.U. 19 febbraio 1963, n. 48 (It.), available at
http://www.normattiva.it./uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:1egge: 1963-02-09;66.
Subsequently, this law was interpreted to have abrogated the requirement that at least
one half of all lay jurors at the Corte d'assise be women. PALICI DI SUN, supra note
49, at 80.
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B. The Italian Women's Movement-From Outside Political
Institutions
Italy's feminist movement in the 1970s aggressively sought to end
male dominance of all spheres of public life and male control over
women in their private lives as well.'2 3 A full history of the women's
movement in Italy is beyond the scope of this article.124 Rather, this
section describes a few examples of Italian women exerting some
political power outside of governmental institutions to advance laws
of particular importance to women-the franchise, the right to an
abortion, and changes to archaic rape laws.125 Italian feminism in the
1970s took "a radical anti-institutional" stance 2 6 since governmental
institutions continued to exclude women. Certainly, the limited
success of the movement illustrates that women can assert political
power outside of the institutions of government through an effective
civil society. On the other hand, these examples also reveal the
serious disadvantages women face when they are denied political
space within public institutions. Upon the unification of Italy,
women in Tuscany and Lombardia-Veneto lost the right to vote, and
all Italian women were denied this right for more than fifty years,
despite protests in the streets and piazzas.127 This fifty-year struggle
resulted in Italian women acquiring the right to vote in 1946-a
small, albeit important, access to political space.12 8
Yet access to political rights did not ensure access to political
space, which meant that other anachronistic laws took even longer to
change.129 For example, to control of the space of women's bodies,
the fascist penal code of 1930, Codice Rocco, criminalized
abortions.130  To preempt a referendum that would have
decriminalized abortion, the Italian Parliament enacted law number
123. See Introduction: Coming from the South, in ITALIAN FEMINIST THOUGHT: A READER
10-11 (Paoloa Bono & Sandra Kemp eds., 1991).
124. Readers wishing to explore Italian feminism may initially consult ITALIAN FEMINIST
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Graziella Parati & Rebecca West eds., 2002) and ITALIAN
FEMINIST THOUGHT: A READER (Paola Bono & Sandra Kemp eds., 1991).
125. See infra notes 127-29, 131-38 and accompanying text.
126. Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice of Sexual Difference and Feminist Thought in Italy:
An Introductory Essay, in SEXUAL DIFFERENCE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL-SYMBOLIC
PRACTICE 1, 6 (Teresa de Lauretis ed., Teresa de Lauretis & Patricia Cicogna trans.,
The Milan Women's Bookstore Collective, 1990).
127. PALICI DI SUNI, supra note 49, at 37-38.
128. See id. at 41.
129. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
130. Codice Penale [C.p.] arts. 545-555 (1930). For the only English translation of the
1930 Italian Penal Code, see Italian Penal Code, in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES (John Delaney ed., Edward M. Wise trans., 1978).
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194 in 1978 to regulate voluntary abortions within the first ninety
days of pregnancy and criminalize abortions that did not comply with
the law."' This law allowed for abortions in specific and very
narrow circumstances and also included a provision that allowed
doctors to refuse to perform abortions.13 2 Despite waves of women
taking to the streets,"' a referendum drafted by women to repeal this
law failed in 1981, thus allowing male-dominated political space to
continue to control women's bodies.'3 4 Also during the 1970s,
women organized several protests against sexual violence,'35 to raise
awareness about sexual violence within families,"' and to advance
voter initiatives to reform outdated rape laws.'3 7 Eventually, a
number of women's groups presented 300,000 signatures in support
of a new rape law to Parliament.' Certainly, this was a very
powerful statement that came about despite the historic exclusion of
women from political institutions. However, it was not until 1996,
nearly twenty years later, that Parliament finally enacted changes to
the rape laws; but Parliament did not adopt all of the changes sought
by the voter initiative.'39 While work outside political institutions has
led to some very modest advances for women, the difficulties
encountered with such measures and the glacial pace of these
131. Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194, in G.U. 2 maggio 1978, n. 140 (It.), translated and
available at
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/history/degrazia/courseworks/legge 194.pdf; see also
Yasmine Ergas, 1968-79 Feminism and the Italian Party System: Women's Politics in
and Decade of Turmoil, 3 COMP. PoL. 253, 265-71 (1982) (demonstrating women's
efforts to put into place legal and completely unrestricted abortions).
132. See L. n. 140/1978 (It.), translated and available at http://www.columbia.edulitc/
history/degrazia/courseworks/legge1 94.pdf.
133. Emma Baeri, Cerniere di Cittadinanza: I Progetto Femminile degli anni '70, in UNA
DEMOCRAZIA INCOMPIUTA [Critical Aspects of Citizenship: The Feminist Project of
the 70s, in AN INCOMPLETE DEMOCRACY] 154, 160-61 (Nadia Maria Filippini & Anna
Scattigno eds., 2007).
134. See id. at 164-65. While this example is not directly related to the serious
disproportionate representation of men in the Italian Parliament, the failure of this
referendum illustrates the continued dominance of women by men. Certainly, this
also illustrates that not all women support access to abortions.
135. Id. at 167 (describing a nighttime march called "take back the night").
136. Id
137. Id. at 168.
138. Id. at 169.
139. For discussions of aspects of Italy's reform of its rape law, see Rachel A. Van Cleave,
Renaissance Redux? Chastity and Punishment in Italian Rape Law, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 335, 335-37 (2008) (focusing on a provision that allows a reduced sentence
for sexual assaults which a judge determines are "less serious"); Rachel A. Van
Cleave, Rape and the Querela in Italy: False Protection of Victim Agency, 13 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 273, 274-75, 292 (2007) (analyzing the failure of the new law to do
away with the ancient requirement that adult women specifically request prosecution).
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advances only further support the need for mechanisms designed to
create space for women in government.140 Such space is much more
likely to facilitate the protection of women's civil and political rights.
IV. ELECTORAL QUOTAS IN ITALY
The account of electoral quotas involves a back-and-forth between
the Italian Parliament and the Constitutional Court about the
constitutionality of the methods enacted for creating political space
for women. Currently, the issue remains before Parliament.14 ' While
this institution initially enacted electoral quotas, it no longer seems
inclined to reenact quotas at the national level.14 2
In a series of measures beginning in 1993, the Italian Parliament
enacted reforms to remove obstacles to women's access to
workplaces and to elected positions.143 While a full consideration of
women in the workplace is beyond the scope of this article,"
affirmative measures to achieve equal access to public and political
spaces began with a focus on the workplace.145 In 1991 the Italian
Parliament enacted a law that called on public and private employers
at the local and national levels to institute affirmative measures to
achieve "substantive equality for women in the workplace and ...
remove obstacles that impede equal opportunity."l 46  The law
required that, within one year of the enactment, all of these entities
adopt plans for carrying out the goals of this law.'4 ' The
Constitutional Court upheld this law as a legitimate exercise of
legislative authority to ensure equal opportunities for women.'4 8 The
140. See generally Van Cleave, Rape and the Querela, supra note 139, at 289 (suggesting
that a twenty year period between popular protest about rape laws and the legislative
change of those laws indicates the slow pace of advances for women in Italy).
141. See generally Marila Guadagnini, The Debate on Women's Quotas in Italian Electoral
Legislation, 4 Swiss POL. Sci. REV. 97, 97-101 (1998) (discussing the enactment and
subsequent repeal of women's voting quotas in Italy).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See generally Lara Lazzaroni, Donne, Lavoro e mestieri negati [Women, Work and
Professions Denied] (2005), available at http://www.uilfpl.it/pdf/
Donne,%20Lavoro%20Lazzeroni.pdf (last visited May 6, 2012) (providing a
condensed history of Italian women's struggle for access to all employment).
145. See infra note 146.
146. Legge 10 aprile 1991, n. 125 art. 1(1) (It). The law also provided for reimbursement
of expenses associated with implementing such affirmative measures. L. n. 125/1991,
art. 2 (It).
147. L. n. 125/1991, art. 2(6) (It.).
148. Corte. Cost., 26 marzo 1993, n. 109 (It.). See Rosalba Valenzano, La Nozione di
Azione Positiva del Dibattito Italiano, in LAVORO DELLE DONNE E AziONI POSITIVE
[The idea of affirmative measures in the Italian debate, in WOMEN'S WORK AND
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1991 law formed the basis for the enactment of other laws to carry
out the goal of creating spaces in a variety of workplaces for
women.14 9 For example, a 1992 law established a national fund to
encourage and support women entrepreneurs who wished to start
their own businesses.5 o It was against this backdrop that Parliament
enacted laws intended to increase the presence of women in elected
offices.
In the context of significant electoral reforms,"' the Italian
Parliament adopted two laws that relied on different mechanisms for
increasing the numbers of women in elected offices. One law
mandated that for communali (city) and provinciali (provincial)
elections, "on the lists of candidates neither sex may represent more
than two-thirds of the candidates listed."'52 Thus, this measure
ensured that political parties would include women on their lists of
candidates, but did not guarantee that any women would necessarily
be elected.' In discussions of this law, senators stated that the goal
of this law was "to overcome a serious deficit in our democracy . .. a
serious underrepresentation of women."l54 In addition, there was
concern that moving from a proportionate system to majority rule
would further exacerbate this problem as it had in France."' Another
law, addressing the election of members of the Camera dei deputati,
the lower house of Parliament, required that the list of representatives
from each party alternate the names of men and women on the
AFFIRMATIVE MEASURES] 253 (Mario Giovanni Garofalo ed., 2002) (discussing
further the laws following the 1991 law and related decisions by the Constitutional
Court).
149. See Valenzano, supra note 148.
150. Legge 25 febbrario 1992, n. 215, art. 3 (It.). This law has since been abrogated.
Decreto legislativo 11 aprile 2006, n. 198 (It).
151. Alessandro Pizzorusso & Emanuele Rossi, Le Azioni Positive in Material Elettorale,
in DONNE IN QUOTA: E GIusTo RISERVARE POSTI ALLE DONNE NEL LAVORO E NELLA
POLITICA? [Affirmative action in election rules, in WOMEN IN QUOTA: IS IT RIGHT TO
RESERVE PLACES FOR WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE AND IN POLITICS?] 169, 170 (Bianca
Beccalli ed., 1999) (noting that electoral reforms included substituting a proportionate
system with a majority one and direct elections of mayors and provincial presidents).
152. Legge 23 febbraio 1995, n. 43, art. 1(6) (It.) ("In ogni lista regionale e provinciale
nessuno dei due sessi pu6 essere rappresentato in misura superiore ai due terzi dei
candidati") (governing elections of consigli delle Regioni); Legge 25 marzo 1993, n.
81, art. 5(2) (It.) ("Nelle liste dei candidate nessuno dei due sessi pu6 esere di norma
reppresentato in misura superiore ai due terzi.").
153, D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 28 (describing this law as a "list quota" guaranteeing only
that women were on the list of those who could be elected).
154. Pizzorusso & Rossi, supra note 151, at 171 n.8 (quoting Atti Senato, 11 marzo 1993).
155. Id. at 171.
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ballot."' These lists are used to fill 25% of the seats in the Camera
dei deputati, and once created, the lists are bloccate or frozen.'
That is, voters do not vote for individuals, but rather for the parties,
and since seats are distributed according to the results of the election,
alternating names on the party lists would ensure that women would
fill every other seat won by parties in elections.' Despite the
different approaches of these two laws, the Constitutional Court
declared them both unconstitutional.'
Taking a formalistic view of articles 3 and 51 of the Italian
Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that these affirmative
measures were unconstitutional.6 0 The court explained that while
section 2 of article 3 requires the republic to pursue affirmative
measures to remove obstacles to equality, such actions are to provide
equal opportunities and may not impair the electoral rights of all
citizens.'6 ' The court relied on article 48 of the constitution, which
declares that all citizens who have reached the age of majority may
vote.162 The court stated that use of quotas, whether by list quotas or
alternating seats, interferes with the citizen's right to vote when sex is
the basis for determining who is or is not on the list or seated as a
member of Parliament.'6 ' The court also relied on the language of
article 51, which states that citizens of each sex may hold elected
office on equal terms and concluded that any form of quotas based on
the sex of candidates violates the equality provision of this article.'"
The court determined that these reasons alone were enough to declare
the quota laws constitutionally illegitimate, but then went on to
"better clarify other aspects of the issue."1' The court did not
analyze closely the differences between the quotas for candidate lists
156. Legge 4 agosto 1993, n. 277, art. 1 (It.) (amending Decreto Presidente della
Repubblica 30 marzo 1957, n. 361, art. 4 (It.)). The 1993 law added the following
sentence to the article describing how parliamentary seats are allocated to the different
parties: "Le liste recanti pid di un nome sono formate da candidati e candidate, in
ordine altemato." ["The lists with more than one name are made up of male and
female candidates in alternating order."].
157. Pizzorusso & Rossi, supra note 151, at 174.
158. D'AMIco, supra note 96, at 28; PIZZORUSSO & Rossi, supra note 151, at 174.
159. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422 (It.).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 6; D'AMIco, supra note 96, at 29-30.
162. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422, § 3 (It.).
163. Id. § 4.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 5.
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and the alternating seating of men and women, but lumped the two
approaches together to find them both unconstitutional."
The court acknowledged that the language of the quota laws is
"neutral" because neither sex is referred to explicitly."' Nonetheless,
the court concluded that the purpose was to ensure that a certain
number of places on the candidate lists was reserved for women (as
to law number 81) or to ensure that women actually obtained
parliamentary seats (as to law number 277), providing a so-called
opportunity for women to be elected versus women actually taking
representative seats."' In concluding that these mechanisms for
determining candidates and members of parliament on the basis of
sex violate the constitution's equality provisions, the court also
acknowledged that "positive actions" are within the scope of article 3
requiring the republic act to remove obstacles to equality. 169  The
court stated that measures enacted to achieve equality for women in
the workplace' and to promote female entrepreneurship' are
legitimate affirmative actions pursuant to that section of article 3.
However, the court specified that those measures do not infringe on
the electoral rights of all citizens specified in article 51, which is very
specific about prohibiting any differentiation on the basis of sex.172
Indeed, the court states that electoral quotas rely on discrimination
now to remedy past discrimination and this is "expressly prohibited
by article 51 of the constitution."" Somewhat ironically, both
Parliament and the court sought to protect the rights of the electorate;
Parliament by creating political space for women 74 and the court by
prohibiting any form of discrimination based on sex as to the
candidates on the ballot.1 5
Interestingly, the court seemed to speak directly to women and
equality advocates, stating:
[S]ince [this court's] inception [in 1956], when presented
with issues related to equality, this [c]ourt has worked
166. D'AMico, supra note 96, at 31 (stating that the court actually confused the two
approaches).
167. At least one conunentator describes this approach as a "gender-neutral regulation."
Drude Dahlerup, What are the Effects of Electoral Gender Quotas?, 6 (July 2006),
http://ipsa-rcl9.anu.edu.au/Dahlerup.ipsa06.pdf.
168. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422 (It.).
169. Id
170. Legge 10 aprile 1991, n. 125 (It.).
171. Legge 25 febbraio 1992, n. 215 (It.).
172. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422 (It.).
173. Id § 6.
174. Id. § 3.
175. Id § 8.
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toward the goal of eliminating all forms of discrimination,
deciding in favor of measures that promote equality.
However, these have always involved measures that did not
directly infringe on the fundamental rights of all citizens.'16
This statement could reveal the court's concern with how equality
advocates might perceive it based upon this decision; perhaps, in part,
because at the time of this decision no woman had been a part of the
court. "' Finally, the court suggested that political parties are
certainly free to adopt affirmative measures voluntarily."' The court
stated "the results sought by the law found unconstitutional may be
achieved by persuading the political parties to realize that it is no
longer possible to delay the need to reach equal representation of
women in public life, particularly in elected positions.""' Nearly ten
years later, the court would concede that the political parties had done
next to nothing to achieve equilibrium.'s
Following the 1995 decision, statistical evidence demonstrates that
Italian political parties did not heed the call to voluntarily increase
the number of elected women representatives.'"' This is best
illustrated by considering the number of women in elected positions
in the years before this decision. In 1968, women made up 2.8% of
the Camera dei deputati and 3.4% of the Senate.1 2 The percentage
of women in the two houses combined was at 2.9% in 1968, the
lowest point historically.183  This combined percentage slowly
increased to 3.2% in 1972, 6.8% in 1976, and 7.2% in 1979, but took
a slight dip in 1976 to 7.1%, then climbed to 10.8% in 1987.184 The
combined percentage dipped again in 1992 to 8.6%.'8' The 1994
176. Id. §7.
177. See Giudici constituzionali dal 1956 [Constitutional Court of Italy: Constitutional
Court Judges since 1956], CORTE COST., http://www.cortecostituzionale.it
ActionPagina_ 210.do.
178. Corte Cost., 12 settembre 1995, n. 422, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1995, 7 (It.).
179. Id.
180. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 182-94 and accompanying text.
182. Marila Guadagnini, La Cittadinanza Politica: La Presenza delle donne in Parlamento
negli anni novanta, in GENERE E DEMOCRAZIA: LA CITTADINANZA DELLE DONNE A
CINQUANT'ANNI DAL VOTO [Political Citizenship: The Presence of Women in
Parliament in the 1990s, in GENDER AND DEMOCRACY: WOMEN'S CITIZENSHIP FIFTY
YEARS AFTER THE VOTE] 51, 54 n.10 (1997).
183. Alessandra Pescarolo, Esclusione a alterita? L'Italia e il Governo Locale Della
Toscana, in UNA DEMOCRAZIA INCOMPIUTA [Exclusion or Otherness? Italy and the
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election, the one election carried out under the 1993 quota law before
it was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, resulted
in women acquiring 15.1% of the seats in the Camera dei Deputati;
"certainly more than in prior elections, yet not close to the level of
parity sought by the 1993 law." 8 ' This resulted in a combined
percentage of 12.8%.' In the subsequent 1996 elections the
presence of women in the Camera dei Deputati slipped to 11.4%181
for a combined result of 9.9%."9 By 2001, women made up only
9.2% of representatives in the Camera and Senato combined."'0 In
2006 women made up 16% of both houses combined.1 9' Currently,
women make up 18.75% of the Senato'92 and 21.43% of the Camera
dei deputati,'93 together constituting 20.09%. It is unclear why the
numbers have increased somewhat. Despite this increase, many
Italian commentators have lamented the serious underrepresentation
of women in Parliament, with some decrying these low numbers as
"scandalous." 94  Indeed, the number of women elected to office in
Italy compares very poorly to that in many other countries.'9
186. Guadagnini, supra note 182, at 54.
187. Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191.
188. Guadagnini, supra note 182, at 54-55.
189. Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191.
190. Califano, supra note 97, at 48 n.1. But see Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191 (stating
that the combined result was 10.3% in 2001).
191. Pescarolo, supra note 183, at 191.
192. Statistics XVI Legislature, SENATO.IT, (Sept. 22, 2012),
http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Statistiche/Composizione/SenatoriPerEta.ht
ml.
193. Chamber of Deputies, Composition of the House - Distinction ofDeputies by Age and
Sex, CAMERAIT, (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.camera.it/Camera/view/
docviewer full?url=http%3A//www.camera.it/564%3Ftiposezione%3DC%26sezion
e%3DI%26tabella%3DC_1_2&back-to=http%3A//www.camera.it/571.
194. See, e.g., Maria Luisa Boccia, Crisi e critica della rappresentanza, in UNA
DEMOCRAZIA INCOMPIUTA [Crisis and critique of representation, in INCOMPLETE
DEMOCRACY] 304 (Nadia Maria Filippini & Anna Scattigno eds., 2007). Many of the
other references in this article to Italian works express concerns about the
underrepresentation of women in Italy. While these numbers are low compared to
many other countries, they are slightly better than the numbers in the United States,
where women make up 17% of each the House of Representatives and the Senate.
The 1121h Congress has 17 women in the Senate (17%). Office of History and
Preservation, Office of the Clerk. Women in Congress, 1917-2006, HOUSE.GOV,
http://womenincongress.house.gov/historical-data/representatives-senators-by-
congress.html?congress=l 12 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
195. See Ami Sedghi, International Women's Day 2012: Women's Representation in
Politics, THE GuAPDIAN (Mar. 7, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
news/datablog/2012/mar/07/women-representation-in-politics-worldwide (ranking
Italy number 57 out of 143 countries regarding percentage of women representatives
in Parliament).
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The creation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, the Carta di Nizza,'96 in 2000 further highlighted this issue at
the European level. Article 23 of this charter provides that
"[e]quality between men and women must be ensured in all areas,
including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall
not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for
specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex." 97 While
this charter is not binding, the Italian Constitutional Court has relied
on provisions of this charter in other decisions,'" and this provision
in particular is relevant to the question of quote rose,'99 or "pink
quotas." Yet, when the issue of electoral quotas for women was
before the Italian Constitutional Court again in 2003, the court did
not refer to the Carta di Nizza.200
The next parry in the back and forth between the Italian Parliament
and the Constitutional Court on the issue of electoral quotas20' arose
while the legislature was in the process of amending constitutional
articles 117 and 51 in 2003.202 A constitutional amendment to article
117 added a section stating, "The regional laws shall remove every
obstacle that impedes full parity between men and women in social,
cultural and economic life and shall promote parity of access to
elected offices for women and men." 20 3  Another constitutional
196. Known in Italy as the Carta di Nizza. See Bill of Rights, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
INFORMATION OFFICE IN ITALY, http://www.europarl.it/ view/it/cittadinanza europea/
cartadei diritti.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012).
197. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 200 O.J. (C 364) 1, art. 23,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eulcharter/pdf/text-en.pdf (last visited Dec.
11,2012).
198. Califano, supra note 97, at 50, n.8 (referring to Corte Cost., 12 novembre 2002, n. 445
(It.); Corte Cost., 11 aprile 2002, n. 135 (It.)).
199. A number of Italian scholars use this term when referring to quotas for women. See,
e.g., D'AMico, supra note 96, at 34.
200. See Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.), available at http://www.giurcost.org/
decisioni/2003/0049s-03.html.
201. The Italian Parliament and the Constitutional Court have engaged in other such back-
and-forth exchanges. See William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to
Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 449-52
(2004) (describing Constitutional Court findings that changes to the Code of Criminal
Procedure violated the constitution and subsequent Parliamentary amendments to the
constitution to allow for such changes).
202. See Marila Guadagnini, Gendering the Debate on Political Representation in Italy: A
Difficult Challenge, in STATE FEMINISM AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 131, 144-47
(Joni Lovenduski ed., 2005); Elisabetta Palici Di Suni, Gender Parity and Quotas in
Italy: A Convoluted Reform Process, 35 W. EUR. POL. 380, 384-85 (2012).
203. Legge Cost. 18 ottobre 2001, n. 3 (It.), available at http://www.parlamento.it/
parlam/leggi/010031c.htm (adding section 7 to article 117 of the Constitution) ("Le
leggi regionali rimuovono ogni ostacolo che impedisce la piena parith degli uomini e
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amendment, that had been approved after its first reading in the
Camera dei deputati, but was not yet final, would eventually add the
following sentence to section 1 of article 51, "to that end [of
establishing equal access to public and elected offices] the Republic
shall promote with appropriate measures equal opportunity between
women and men."2 " In addition to these constitutional amendments,
Parliament also enacted a constitutional law that states, "In order to
attain equilibrium of representation of the sexes, the law shall
promote conditions of equal access to the electoral process."2 05
While these changes to the constitution were being enacted, the
autonomous region of Valle d'Aosta adopted a regional law, which
provided that "[e]very list of candidates for the election of the
Consiglio must include candidates of both sexes."206
Oddly enough, at the same time that the Italian government was
working on constitutional reforms to overturn the Constitutional
Court's 1995 decision striking electoral quotas, it challenged the
Valle D'Aosta law cited above requiring the presence of both sexes
on candidate lists.207 The government argued that the Valle D'Aosta
law violated article 51 of the constitution and was inconsistent with
delle donne nella vita sociale, culturale ed economica e promuovono la parita di
accesso tra donne e uomini alle cariche elettive.").
204. Art. 51 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), available at http://www.senato.it/istituzione/
29375/131289/131328/131332/articolo.htm ("A tale fine la Repubblica promuove con
appositi prevvedimenti le pari opportunitA tra donne e uomini.").
205. Legge Cost 31 gennaio 2001, n. 2 (It.), available at
http://www.parlamento.it/parlami/leggi/010021c.htm ("Al fine di conseguire
l'equilibrio della rappresentanza dei sessi, la... legge promuove condizioni di paritA
per I'accesso alle consultazioni elettorali.").
206. Legge regionale 13 novembre 2002, n. 21 (It.), available at
http://www.consiglio.regione.vda.it/ banche dati/leggi regolamentildettaglio
i.asp?pk_1r-2682&versione=S ("Ogni lista di candidati all'elezione del Consiglio
regionale deve prevedere la presenza di candidati di entrambii sessi."). This provision
was subsequently amended to provide that "[i]n every list of candidates for the
election of the Consiglio regionale neither sex may represent more than 20% of the
candidates on the list." L. Reg. 7 agosto 2007, n. 22 (It.), available at
http://www.consiglio.regione.vda.it/banchedati/leggi
regolamenti/dettaglio i.asp?pkIr=4124. Other similar regional statutes and laws
were enacted between 2002 and 2010, but the Valle D'Aosta law was the subject of a
constitutional court decision discussed above. For a comprehensive list of laws, court
decisions and other materials relevant to the question of electoral quotas, see
D'AMico, supra note 96, at 146-229.
207. D'AMIcO, supra note 96, at 34. See also Lorenza Carlassare, La legittimita della
"preferenza di genere ": una nuova sconfitta della linea del Governo contro la parita
[The legitimacy of "gender preferences ": a new defeat of the Government's position
against parity] 55 GIUR. COST. 81, 83 (2010) ("[T]he government's stubborn
opposition to laws that attempt to carry out the constitutional laws favoring equality in
elected offices is nearly incredible.").
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the court's decision of 1995, claiming that the law amounted to a
quota for women candidates because it required a minimum of one
woman candidate on all lists.20 8  The government argued that the
court had previously disregarded any distinction between electoral
laws that simply required women be on lists of candidates and thus
eligible for election, so-called eleggibilit, and laws that ensured a
certain number of women would hold elected office, or so-called
candidabiliti.2 09 However, in its 2003 decision, the court examined
this distinction more closely, as well as the effect of ensuring access
to electoral slates. 2 10 The court found that this law, and others like it,
did not violate the constitutional equality norms.21'
The court first stated that the measure at issue involved only
candidate lists and those who could be on the lists, eleggibiliti and
not candidabilita.2 12 In addition, the court held that the Valle
D'Aosta measure did not create inequality to address past inequality
and thus did not infringe on the rights of voters.213  Rather, this
measure merely denies political parties the ability to present lists of
candidates made up of individuals of only one sex.2 14 It is not
entirely clear how this is different from the law found
unconstitutional in 1995 that did not permit either sex to make up
more than two-thirds of a list, other than the fact that the prior law set
out a specific percentage of the list reserved for one sex.215 However,
in its 2003 opinion the court acknowledged that its analysis was
consistent with an "evolved" constitutional paradigm. 2 16  The court
then cited to the constitutional law of 2001, which expressly directs
208. See Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.), available at
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2003/0049s-03.html; GUADAGNINI, supra note 202,
at 144-47; Rodriguez-Ruiz & Rubio-Marin, Constitutional Justification of Parity
Democracy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2005).
209. Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.).
210. See id.
211. See id. § 5.
212. See id. § 3.1.
213. See id. §4.
214. See id. § 4, 4.1.
215. See generally Giuditta Brunelli, Un Overruling in tema di norme elettorali
antidiscriminatorie [An Overruling on the issue of anti-discrimination electoral
measures] 5 LE REGIONI 902 (2003) (commenting on Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n.
49 (It.)); Antonio D'Aloia, Egualianza Sostanziale e Azioni Posiive in Materia
Elettorale, in VERSO UNA DEMOCRAZIA PARITARIA - MODELLI E PERCORSI PER LA
PIENA PARTECIPAZIONE DELLE DONNE ALLA VITA POLITICA E ISTITUZIONALE [Substantive
Equality and Affirmative Electoral Measures, in TOWARD A DEMOCRACY OF PARITY -
APPROACHES FOR ACHIEVING FULL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL LIFE] 49, 61 (Anna Falcone ed., 2011).
216. See Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.).
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the regional electoral laws to promote conditions of parity for access
to the electoral process precisely with the goal of achieving equal
representation of the sexes. 2 17 The court found the Valle D'Aosta law
consistent with the constitutional law.m
While stating that the following fact was not decisive, the court
harkened back to its earlier call for political parties to take voluntary
actions to increase the number of women elected to political
positions, and stated that since "political parties have not
demonstrated much, if any, propensity to act voluntarily to achieve
greater equality of representation, as the court had urged in its 1995
opinion, now the parties are constrained by law pursuant to the recent
constitutional law."21 9 The court seemed to suggest that the failure or
reluctance of political parties to address this issue resulted in the
enactment of legal requirements to achieve a goal of greater sexual
parity for elected offices.
While the Constitutional Court did not address the pending changes
to article 51 of the constitution in its 2003 opinion, it set out quite
emphatically the effects of this change in a 2005 opinion.2 20 The
2005 Constitutional Court case involved a 1993 law 22 ' requiring that,
for positions subject to competition examinations, at least one-third
of those taking the examination be women. The Consiglio di Stato
challenged a competition examination for director of a local museum
that, pursuant to the 1993 law, required that at least one-third of the
examinees be women. 2 22 The Consiglio di Stato claimed that a man
had been excluded from this particular competition due to his sex.223
The court dismissed this challenge with a short opinion stating that
the lower court had relied only on the Constitutional Court's decision
of 1995 and did not take into account the changes to article 51 of the
constitution, the 2001 constitutional law, and the Constitutional
Court's decision of 2003.224 The court provided an initial glimpse of
its interpretation of the changes to article 51, stating that "with this
new language, the law is no longer limited to prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex, ... but now assigns to the
217. See id. at 4.
218. Corte Cost., 13 febbraio 2003, n. 49 (It.).
219. Id. § 4; see also Yvonne Galligan, Bringing Women in: Global Struggles for Gender
Parity in Political Representation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
319, 332 (2006) (despite the creation of formal party rules in the reform of the Italian
Communist Party that included a 40% quota for women, in 2003 women made up
only 24% of the party's deputies).
220. Cort Cost., 12 gennaio 2005, n. 39 (It.).
221. Decreto Legislativo 3 febbraio 1993, n. 29 (It.).
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Republic the obligation of promoting equal opportunity between men
and women." 2 2 5  Thus, although the court did not set out a
comprehensive interpretation of the changes to article 51, the court
nonetheless described these changes as a clear shift in the
constitutional approach to gender equality. 2 26
In 2010, the court had the opportunity to apply the new article 51 to
electoral quotas.2 27  Like the 2005 decision, the 2010 opinion also
involved a regional election law of the Campania region. 228 Similar
to the law governing Italian representation in the European
Parliament, this law provides that in every electoral list neither sex
may be represented by more than two-thirds of the candidates.229
Furthermore, the law voided every list that did not comply with this
requirement. 23 0 However, the provision that the Consiglio di Stato
challenged was one that directed voters to "select one or two names
[from the list of candidates]. If [the voter] selected two names, one
must be male and the other must be female, otherwise the second
name selected would be void." 231  The government claimed that this
portion of the law violated both articles 3 and 51 of the
constitution.2 32 The law violated article 3, according to the
government, because it treated the second candidate unequally based
on his or her sex if he or she was of the same sex as the first
candidate selected by the voter.2 33  The law violated article 51
because it tied access to an elected position to the sex of the second
candidate selected by the voter and was thus an improper basis for
unelectability.234 The Region of Campania emphasized the neutrality
of the language used in the statute, which would void both a selection
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Corte Cost., 15 dicembre 2009, n. 4 (It.).
228. Legge regionale 27 marzo 2009, n. 4, in Boll. Uff. Reg. Campania, 14 aprile 2009, n.
23 (It.).
229. Id. art. 10(2).
230. Id. 10(3).
231. Id. art. 4(3) ("L'elettore pu6 esprimere ... uno o due voti di preferenza . .. Nel caso
di espressione di due preferneze, una deve riguardare un candidato di genere maschile
e l'altra un candidato di genere femminile della stess lista, pena l'annullamneto della
seconda preferenza."). It is not clear why some regional laws use the term "gender"
rather than "sex." However, it does not seem likely that the regions using the term
gender intend this to indicate any particular "gender theory." See Marco Olivetti, La
c.d. "preferenza di genere" al vaglio del sindacato di costituzionalitb. Alcuni rilievi
critici [The so-called "gender preferences" and their constitutionality. A few critical
points/observations] 1 GIUR. COST. 84, 86 n.7 (2010).
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of two women as well as a selection of two men candidates. 2 35 The
court set out an extensive summary of the Campania's argument,
which includes a timeline of the court's related decisions, changes to
the constitution in between the decision number 422 of 1995 and the
decision number 49 of 2003, other legislative measures, European
Charters, La Carta Nizza, as well as Commission decisions.2 36 In
particular, the Campania region pointed to the language of the
amendment to article 51 directing the republic to promote equal
opportunity between men and women using appropriate provisions.2 37
The court described the law challenged as one that seeks to achieve
greater equilibrium between the sexes in elected office while also
seeking to avoid infringing on the rights of the Italian voters to vote
for the candidate(s) of their choice. 23 8 The court further explained the
Campania law as giving voters an opportunity to select two
candidates; a voter need not select two.239 In addition, the law does
not void the entire ballot if the voter selects two candidates of the
same sex; rather, the law voids only the second selection. 24 0 Given
these aspects of this law, the court concluded that it creates a greater
possibility of achieving greater equality in the election of women, but
does not impose election of particular candidates. 24 ' Thus, the court
found that this law constitutionally promotes equality without being
coercive or intruding on the rights of voters.242
The Campania law in fact resulted in the election of more
women.243 In the March 2010 regional elections, out of sixty seats up
for election, fourteen women were elected.2 " While about 23% may
not seem like much, it is certainly a dramatic improvement from the
election of only two women in 2005 in this region.2 45 In addition, this
235. Id. § 2 (setting out Campania's argument).
236. Id. § 3 (summarizing Campania's briefed arguments).
237. Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 2010, n. 4, (It.), available at http://www.giurcost.org/
decisioni/2010/0004s-10.html (setting out Campania's argument in support of its
election law).
238. Id § 3.2.
239. As one commentator has pointed out, another option voters have is to simply vote the
list without expressing a preference for any candidates. Olivetti, supra note 231, at
87.
240. Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 2010 n. 4, (It.), § 1.3, available at http://www.giurcost.org/
decisioni/2010/0004s-10.html.
241. Id. § 3.3.
242. Id § 3.2.
243. See Stefania Leone, La preferenza di genere come sturmento per "ottenere,
indirettamente ed eventualmente, il risultato di un'azione positive," 1 GIUR. COST. 93,
94(2010).
244. Id
245. D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 45; Leone, supra note 243, at 93, 94.
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result is better than that achieved in other regions.246 Piemonte
elections achieved the same results as those in Campania (fourteen
women out of sixty positions),24 7 but in Lombardia, only seven
women were elected out of eighty seats 24 8 (about 8.7%) and only
twelve out of seventy-one seats in Lazio were filled by women (about
17%).249 Meanwhile, in Calabria and Basilicata, no women were
elected at all.250 While these developments are certainly promising, a
number of attempts to enact electoral quotas at the national level
since the constitutional changes have failed.
For example, one proposal presented in 2004 would have restored
the limit that neither sex make up more than two-thirds of a party's
candidate list.25 1 In addition, this proposal would have required that
men and women candidates be listed in an alternating fashion.252
This proposal would have also included reduced state financial
support for political parties presenting candidate lists in violation of
these requirements. 253  This proposed law was approved by the
Senate, but modified to require the presence of 50% of each sex in a
party's candidate lists. 254 However, the conclusion of the legislative
session meant that this never became law. Another proposal would
have required that no more than three candidates of the same sex
could be listed consecutively on a party's list in the election
following enactment of the law, and in the subsequent election, no
more than two candidates of the same sex could be so listed.2 55 This
measure was presented by the government but was blocked in the
Senate after disagreement among the majority.25 6  This particular
proposal would have applied to only two elections, and thus was
limited in time.257
The back and forth between the Italian Parliament and the
Constitutional Court was settled after the constitutional amendments;
yet, nearly ten years after these changes, attempts to reenact electoral
246. Id. at 93, 94 n.10.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 94 n.10.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. JOCELYNE PRAUD & KARL A. HENRIQUES, THE SASK. INST. OF PUB. POLICY,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING AND LEGISLATING PARITY DEMOCRACY: THE CASES OF FRANCE
AND BELGIUM 56, 14 n.9 (2008).
252. GIOVANNI CHIOLA, PROBLEMI SULLE QUOTE ROSE (2008).
253. Id. at 81-83, 198-200.
254. D'AMICO, supra note 96, at 62.
255. CHIOLA, supra note 252, at 83-85, 204-05.
256. Id. at 85.
257. Id. at 84.
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quotas at the national level have failed in precisely the political
spaces in which women are attempting to gain greater access.25 8 This
is another example of reforms that come tantalizingly close to
achieving equality yet proceed at a grudgingly sluggish pace. Of
course, the irony is that women's meager representation in Parliament
endures in large part because the male-dominated Parliament has not
successfully enacted laws to alleviate this problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Aside from traditional notions of equality, the principal argument
against electoral quotas for women is that quotas are based on an
assumption that women can better represent other women. 259 This in
turn, is based on an essentialist understanding of women's identity.2 60
Certainly, awareness of essentialism and the need to ensure that no
universal female identity is presumed has played an important role in
broadening feminism to include more than simply white, middle class
women. However, in the context of elected positions, where women
have been deliberately excluded, as in Italy,2 6 1 it is important to
weigh anti-essentialist concerns against the continued monopolization
of political space by men. The history of how this monopoly has
severely limited citizenship rights of women demonstrates how
critically powerful political space is and how important it is to enact
mechanisms to open political space to more women.262 Furthermore,
creating greater political space for women can help to address
essentialist perceptions by debunking deeply rooted stereotypes about
the proper role of women in Italy.263 A recent United Nations report
stating that "[v]iolence against women remains a significant problem
in Italy,",26 links the structural issue of male dominance in the public
and private sectors as one explanation for both the high rate of
violence against women as well as the dramatic underreporting of this
violence. The Special Rapporteur recommends, among other
specifics, that Italy address the "gender disparities in public and
private sectors ... to increase the number of women ... in the
258. See supra notes 201-02, 250-57 and accompanying text.
259. Rosenblum, supra note 20, at 1182.
260. Rosenblum, supra note 20, at 1135-37.
261. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 9-11, 15 and accompanying text.
264. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women,
its causes and consequences, at 14, U.N. Doc A/HRC/29/16/Add.2 (June 15, 2012)
(by Rashida Manjoo), available at http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16-Add2 en.pdf.
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political, economic, social, cultural and judicial spheres."265 Opening
these public spaces to women can eliminate women's negative
presence and both broaden and deepen political discourse.2 66 It
would be unfortunate if anti-essentialist concerns were the basis for
perpetuating women's negative presence in the political arena.
265. Id. at 23.
266. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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